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Abstract
Epistemology is one of the oldest branches of philosophy that
is basically concerned with the scope and aim of knowledge, the
means of knowledge, and the justification of knowledge. There are
instances in the Western tradition where philosophy is reduced to
mere epistemology. But there are also systems or schools of thought
that balance epistemology with metaphysics.  For my present study I
have chosen one of the most distinguished contemporary Indian phi-
losophers, B.K. Matilal. I propose to discuss how he understands this
balance.
I
Epistemology is one of the oldest branches of philosophy that is
basically concerned with the scope and aim of knowledge, the means of
knowledge, and the justification of knowledge. There are instances in the
Western tradition where philosophy is reduced to epistemology. For
example, the Continental rationalists and the classical British empiricists
found nothing more enterprising than epistemology in their respective
doctrines. We find a similar case with metaphysics. For example, in the
philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger the focus on metaphysics is
conspicuous. But there are also systems or schools of thought that have a
balanced view as regards the nature of epistemology and metaphysics for
they believe that these two traditional branches of philosophy are not
independent from each other, rather they are interdependent. Therefore,
they cannot afford to ignore each other. Among the many examples of this
approach, are the classic approaches of Kant in the Western tradition,
and Indian philosophical systems in general. Of course, in the philosophy
of Nyaya the epistemological and logical concerns dominate all other
aspects of philosophy. This does not mean that Nyaya did not subscribe
to any metaphysical standpoint. As an allied system of Vaisesika, Nyaya
admitted its metaphysics. Now we have, at least, two distinctive approaches
to epistemology. They are: (1) epistemology per se  is independent of any
other branch of knowledge, (2) epistemology cannot be separated from
metaphysics. The Western epistemologists in general subscribe to the former
view, and their Indian counterparts to the latter. For my present study I
have chosen one of the most distinguished contemporary Indian
philosophers, late Professor B.K. Matilal (hereafter BKM). I propose to
discuss his approach to epistemology in general.
In his book on Perception: An Essay in Classical Indian
Theories of Knowledge, BKM writes that: “ The dispute that lasted in a
little over twelve centuries between the Nyaya and the Buddhist over the
nature of perception, the critique and criteria of knowledge, and the status
of the external world  is undoubtedly an important chapter in the history of
global philosophy.”1 Just as we come across realism, phenomenalism, and
representationalism in the Western epistemology, we also come across
these doctrines in Indian philosophical systems, especially in Nyaya and
Buddhism. Therefore, for any Western reader, as rightly pointed by BKM,
this would be a familiar area. Another interesting point is that some modern
Indian philosophers have produced illuminating expositions and
reformulations of some of the speculative metaphysical doctrines with a
view to highlight the traditional style of philosophizing in India. This is a
laudable effort on the part of those who have undertaken this exercise of
making the philosophical theories of India more prominent and appealing.
Yet, the modern Indian philosophers, who are under the influence of
analytical tradition of the West, may not find these doctrines all that
illuminating. The reason that is attributed to this state of affairs by BKM is
that these writings are opaque and blurred. I do not quite agree with BKM’s
stand on this issue. Of course BKM held that most of these metaphysical
theories were discussed out of context. Consequently, these most
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sophisticated theories were conveniently ignored as inessential.2  I personally
feel that the Western epistemologists have to reconcile with the fact that
these theories are not understood by the modern Western philosophers,
not because they are opaque and blurred, but because their  method of
analysis cannot penetrate into the structural depths of the classical Indian
philosophical theories. I would say that the method of analysis advocated
by the modern Western epistemologists is found wanting in many respects.
To put it in the language of Wittgenstein, the rules of the game played by
the classical Indian philosophers are totally different from those of the
game played by the modern Western philosophers.
It is opined by BKM that pramana method, to use Indian
terminology, is invariably linked up with the prameyas. To quote BKM in
this context: “ The metaphysical doctrines of classical India developed in
the background of intense intellectual activity in philosophy.  Hence they
are imbedded in the philosophical style that was current at that time, and
this was subtly oriented by epistemological concerns and orchestrated by
the logical theories of classical India.”3 BKM is right when he held that the
establishment of any metaphysical theory is dependent on certain
epistemological considerations (pramanadhina prameya-sthitih). To put
it in the modern terminology, our epistemological and logical concerns
precede our metaphysical and ontological ones, for the latter can be
approached only with the help of the former.
II
In order to drive his point home, BKM highlighted the importance
of pramana epistemology and its logical significance in determining our
metaphysical/ontological4 commitments or priorities.  He assumes that all
of us, when we are in a pre-philosophical state, believe that there is a
world external to us, and existing independent of us. This is a position
taken by realists in general. However, it is not all that easy to philosophically
prove or disprove this commonplace belief. For centuries together
philosophers have advocated theories after theories either to establish or
to falsify this commonplace belief. The existence of pre-philosophical,
pre-reflective, and pre-critical certainties is always doubted by
philosophers. The commonplace belief that there is a material or physical
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world independent of our awareness of it is questioned by philosophers
by advancing a counter thesis that the so called external reality or world is
only mind-dependent and it can be vindicated by rational means. The
skeptics on the other hand viewed it in a different way. According to them,
it is not possible to arrive at any definite position as regards the status of
material or physical world. All that philosophers could do is to advance
the theories of various sorts, which often conflict with each other, to explain
their position as regards the status of the material or physical world.
Therefore, these theories are highly presumptuous. They are only poor
substitutes for truth. This being the case, suggest BKM, “if the cloths do
not fit we may either decide to remain naked or buy new ones that may fit
better. The skeptics may prefer the pristine purity of nakedness, but others
choose the latter.”5
It is generally held that when our beliefs are proven to be true they
acquire the status of knowledge.  On of the aims of philosophy as an
activity, is to define the characteristics of knowledge, and to set forth
certain criteria for obtaining knowledge in the sense in which its
characteristics are defined.  In this sense, claims, BKM, the purpose of
epistemology or pramana-sastra in Indian tradition is not in any way
different from that of the Western tradition. Epistemology, which is basically
concerned with theory of knowledge, investigates and evaluates the
evidence, our methods of reasoning, and the criteria upon which our
knowledge claims are dependent.6 Apart  from that, the common point
shared by both Indian and Western philosophical traditions is, as aptly put
forth by BKM, their concern for truth or reality, which is also known as
divinity. Therefore, the quest for knowledge in both traditions has given
rise to a number of interesting results. According to BKM, pramana is
that which leads to a knowledge-episode called prama as its end.
Interestingly, evaluation of our evidence to knowledge is invariably
linked up with the question of the sources of knowledge. Out of these
sources, one very important source recognized by empiricist tradition in
the West is sense-experience, which provides us with immediate
knowledge. Accordingly, it is held that the real base for our theoretical
and objective knowledge lies in observation of aspects of reality. In its
weak form it is held that all our knowledge must start with sense-experience
and its validation is always subject to some form of observational data.
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Some pramana theorists in India have advocated their weaker version of
the empirical tradition of the West. One of the advocates of such a position
is Uddyotakara. According to him: “we emphasize perception, for all
pramanas (in some way or other) preceded by (sensory) perception.”7
The result of such a position is that conception without perception is empty.
The counter thesis of this claim is that perception without conception is
blind. But BKM claims that this counter thesis too is incompatible with
empiricist doctrine, for it advocates the view that pre-conceptual or non-
conceptual perception is blind and unrevealing. However, such a non-
conceptual experience is possible as advocated by the Indian
epistemologists in the form of nirvikaplaka pratyaksa. But such a
possibility does not deter the pramana theorists from advocating their
theory.  In fact, such a perception maintains the ontological neutrality
regarding the status of concepts.
Further BKM maintains that the most important aspect of such a
philosophic position is ‘experience’. Both our factual knowledge and
knowledge of existence are necessarily justified on the basis of experience.
If this were so, we need to define the expression ‘experience’ in clear
terms. Both the Western and the Indian epistemologists are not very clear
about this expression.  BKM feels that the most suitable Sanskrit expression
for the expression ‘experience’ is pratiti or anubhava. Like in the Indian
tradition, the Western tradition too the expression ‘experience’ is used as
an ultimate court of appeal for any knowledge claim. However, this
argument does not stand the critical scrutiny for obvious reasons. The
most immediate, non-conceptual experience is barren because it does not
have any explanatory content within it.  Consequently, nothing can be put
forward in the form of a legitimate statement.8
III
BKM analyzes the various theories of perception of classical Indian
type in the context of pramana epistemology. For this purpose first he
highlights the salient features of pramana doctrine that inevitably resulted
in a form of skepticism. One of the chief traits of skepticism is that it
always questioned the very possibility of our knowledge of the external
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world. Thus it remained a constant shadow of epistemology both in Indian
and Western traditions. In a way, it has driven the subject of experience to
think how the world ‘appears’ to the subject. Thus it paved the way for a
distinction between an experience and its interpretation, between a crude
sensory data and logical construction out of them.
BKM agues that empiricists claim sensory experience provides
us with the ‘building blocks’ of knowledge. If what is called knowledge is
constructed out of these ‘building blocks’, then the very edifice of our
knowledge represents mere appearance, but not the reality. Such a
treatment of knowledge made skeptic to contest the legitimacy of empiricist
claim to the knowledge of the external world, for it is not established.
Even the causal theory of perceptual experience is no better for it makes
the subject of experience speculate about the true nature of the external
world which is never given in perceptual experience. According to BKM,
both the Western epistemologists and the pramana theorists are trapped
in the same boat when they try to look for, with a sense of hesitation, some
subjective element in support of our objective knowledge. Now it is left
for the epistemologists of both traditions to bridge the gap between
subjective and objective elements to substantiate our knowledge claims.
Pramana theorists in general hold the view that no knowledge is possible
independently of some perceptual basis or other. Even the scriptural
knowledge is not exempted from this condition. They hold the view that
direct experience of such people like the Buddha or the Jaina resulted in
scriptural knowledge. It is believed by Naiyayikas that the Vedas are
spoken by God. Hence, their validity is as sure as the validity of the
statements made by a reliable and trustworthy person. Although Mimamsa
does not support this claim, the Vedanta joins the camp of pramana
theorists in this regard.
When BKM speaks of empiricism, he uses this expression with
utmost caution. He does not use it as a movement that opposed the
continental rationalism of the West. Following the flag of W. V. Quine,
BKM holds that an empiricist doctrine is one that insists on the observational
basis of our knowledge. However, there may be some do believe in the
existence of mind-independent universals or realities. Such a claim to mind-
independent realities does not really bar them from being empiricists. The
sixth century AD philosopher Bhartrhari held that all of us possess certain
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amount of innate disposition to articulate concepts in speech. This is an
acquired disposition, maintains BKM, for it is derived from (in a
metaphysical sense) the residual (memory) traces of the experiences of
every individual in countless previous births (purvahita samskara). This
view of Bhartrhari can be compared with that of Plato. According to the
latter, learning in a way is a process of recollection of that knowledge
possessed by an individual before birth.  The Buddhists claim that universals
are mere convenient myths. Like a vehicle they are dispensable once the
goal is achieved. On the contrary, Nyaya holds that some natural universals
are objectively real and perceivable for they have instantiations that are
perceptible. The point that BKM wants to drive home here is that although
there are doctrinal differences among the various schools of Indian tradition,
yet majority of the schools can be brought under the camp of pramana
theorists.
IV
Skeptical arguments against accepted doctrines are found both in
the Western and the Indian traditions of epistemology. The pramana
theorists in general have their own arguments against the skeptics’ claim
that knowledge is a remote possibility. According to Nyaya epistemology,
perhaps one of the earliest arguments against the challenges of skepticism,
we can know what is out there with the help of pramana. Therefore, the
object of knowledge (prameya) is definitely known. Before the emergence
of full-fledged philosophical systems in India, there were ancient skeptics
like Sanjaya and others (between 600 to 100 BC) who directed their
skepticism against the possibility knowledge pertaining to moral, religious,
and eschatological matters. Sanjaya questioned the veracity of the
statements made about these matters. According to BKM, the following
questions never found any satisfactory answers. Therefore, they remained
unexplained. They are as follows:9
1. Does anything survive death?
2. Is the world finite?
3. Is there a soul different from body?
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4. Does he who acts ‘enjoy’, i.e., get reward and punishment?
5. What is right and what is wrong?
The skepticism about the truth-claims of the above mentioned
questions gradually paved the way for the skepticism about the truth claims
of the very possibility of knowledge. It is in fact in the writings of Nagarjuna
(2nd century AD), the great Madhyamika Buddhist, one can come across
a systematic and skeptical challenge to a theory of knowledge. Later on it
was the skeptics like Jayarasi (8th century AD) and Sriharsa (11th century
AD) questioned the claims to knowledge. There were also the skeptics in
the form of monistic metaphysicians who were critical of pramana method.
Thus there was a constant debate between the advocates of pramana
theory and the skeptics.
The skeptical dialecticians of India followed a ‘radical’ method to
expose the knowledge-claims of the epistemologists. They contested that
the very concept of knowledge and its foundations are either paradoxical
or circular. BKM defends the Indian skeptics like Nagarjuna, Sanjaya,
Jayarasi, and Sriharsa for they have not indulged in the construction of any
metaphysical system. Although it is true of Sanjaya and Jayarasi, it is not
the case with Nagarjuna and Sriharsa. BKM admits that it is arguable
whether Nagarjuna and Jayarasi have subscribed to any metaphysical
position at all. Perhaps, the skepticism advocated by them is only a
complementary to their soteriological goal in the sense that it serves as a
ladder to climb up, and then to be discarded. The aim of these two skeptics
is to show the limitations of pure reason in sorting out the knowledge
claims of one sort or other. In the process of resolving the rival knowledge
claims pure reason would lose itself in the quicksand of contradictions.  In
fact it is held in the Lankavatara-sutra: “The own nature of things cannot
be ascertained by the analytical exercise of intellect (Buddhi). Therefore,
they (the things) are shown to be ineffable and ‘without own nature.”10
This statement suggests that reason cannot discover the real nature of
things. In a way, it is a reminder to the rationalists of traditions that reason
cannot penetrate into the very nature of things.
BKM believes that philosophical empiricism is ingrained in some
form of skepticism. The very problem of uncertainty regarding the claims
to knowledge necessitated epistemologists of both traditions to look for
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secure foundations of knowledge that rest on direct evidence (experience).
The pramana theorists subscribed to only a weaker form of empiricism.
According to them, sense-experience is only a starting point of knowledge.
The reason is that most of them advocated other sources of knowledge
apart from sense-experience. On the contrary, the skeptics held that there
is an inherent contradiction between the data offered by experience and
reason. Such a contradiction always leads to skepticism but not to any
legitimate theory of knowledge. For instance, Nagarjuna put forth the
following argument to justify his claim that there is no possibility of obtaining
knowledge. The paraphernalia that we use to measure or obtain knowledge
is itself in need of justification. If this point is conceded then the question of
arriving at knowledge of any kind is a remote possibility for this process
ends up in an infinite regress argument. Thus Nagrajuna’s argument remains
a great impediment to pramana theorists for knowledge in any form is an
impossible proposition. If this argument is not conceded then our choice
of selecting a particular standard of measurement is completely arbitrary
and not really appealing to reason. A Cartesian follower might say that
one can choose a standard of measurement that is highly indubitable and
self-evidently true. But the skeptics like Nagajuna would object to this
proposal for the search for an indubitable criterion necessarily involves
subjective element into the whole process. This may not be acceptable to
those epistemologists who insist on some objective standards of criteria.
In order to defend their position, the pramana theorists, in spite
of their different ontological commitments, would agree that whatever exists
can be known.  Further, they argue that whatever is known is existent.
Consequently, it is effable in the sense that it is expressible or nameable in
language. Of course, there are some pramana theorists who hold the
view that knowability is not a sufficient condition for affability. This is not
treated as a major impediment. According to Bhartrhari, human
consciousness always reveals the objects (knowables) with the help of
words for it is ever vibrating. In the absence of such a mechanism, the
revelatory character of human awareness is destroyed. Perception or
awareness of any sort would be meaningless in the absence of word-
mediated act of consciousness. Nyaya does not subscribe to this view for
it admits perception or awareness without effability.  This is due to the fact
that there are objects or knowables that are only known or revealed to
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human consciousness, but may not be expressible through the medium of
language.  To use Wittgenstein’s terminology, they can be called “mystical”.
According to BKM, the thesis of ‘ineffability’ may be viewed
from different standpoints. According to one interpretation, what is grasped
by the senses (perceptual experience) cannot be put into words or
language, for language is a social affair and it can only communicate those
aspects of reality that are inter-subjectively accessible.  Since perceptual
experiences are unique to each subject, the content of such experiences
cannot be communicated. BKM holds that such a view can be, with minor
modifications, attributed to the Buddhist doctrines advocated by Dinnaga
and Dharmakirti. Both these philosophers have subscribed to what is called
phenomenalism, and logical atomism in modern terminology. Just as Russell
held that there must be logically proper names in any ideal language, although
one cannot give an example for it, Dinnaga too held that the pure particular
or pure sense-datum cannot be, in principle, communicated. Thus it remains
ineffable (anirdesya).11 The other interpretation is holistic in its nature.
Accordingly, it regards the reality as a single indivisible whole, which is
undifferentiated. Since the whole cannot be grasped in its fullness, language
reduces it into parts resulting in the proliferation of concepts. Consequently,
all our concepts enter into some contradiction or other. As long as language
operates with the help of concepts, it fails to picture reality.
V
Another interesting feature that we come across in the empiricist
tradition of the West is the cleavage made between a priori (non-empirical)
and a posteriori (empirical)forms of knowledge. The former is the
knowledge obtained independent of experience and the latter is necessarily
dependent upon sense-experience. Such a distinction is not found in the
Indian epistemological tradition.  This may be treated, according to BKM,
as a lacuna in the pramana theory advocated by the Indian epistemologists.
For the sake of convenience, BKM classifies knowledge into non- empirical
and empirical forms. The scriptural knowledge or the knowledge of dharma
can be characterized as non-empirical knowledge for it cannot be derived
through any empirical means such as perception or inference. Here the
expression ‘dharma’ is used in its loose sense to cover religious, social
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and ethical duties of individuals. And we cannot obtain knowledge of these
matters empirically. This is the reason why the skeptics like Sanjaya did
not entertain any questions regarding these matters for knowledge about
these matters is impossible. What BKM wants to stress here is that the
scriptures impart non-empirical or trans-empirical knowledge. Pramana
theorists recognized this form of knowledge for the tradition defines scripture
as  the “ means (in fact, “knowledge-how”) that can be known by neither
perception nor inference is what they come to know through scriptures.
And this constitutes the scripture-hood of the scriptures.”12
What is unique and significant about the scriptural knowledge is
that it is highly infallible. It is held by the great vaidika philosophers like
Bhartrhari and Samkara that the knowledge obtained by empirical means
such as perception and inference may be fallible at times. BKM calls it a
kind of fundamentalism for our knowledge derived from the authority of
scriptures remains infallible because there is no empirical means that can
ever falsify it. To record the statement of Samkara in this context: “The
truth (knowledge-hood) of the Vedic statements is self-established
independently of anything else. It is like the sun which reveals itself while
revealing colours.”13 Thus scriptural knowledge is self-validating. Another
important argument advanced by pramana theorists in general is that
scriptures being apocryphal there is no human agency involved in their
creation. They are the creations of the divine (apauruseya). If a statement
is false, its falsity can be traced back to the shortcomings of those who
propounded it. But in the absence of an author it is treated valid. This
amounts to a dogma. However, BKM puts forward the following
considerations to avoid the charge of dogmatism.
The Mahabharata and Manusmrti held that the truth of dharma
is beyond human comprehension. However it can be obtained by the
means such as scripture, the verdict of the saints and seers, and one’s own
conscience or moral intuition. It is on the notion of intuition or pratibha
that Bhartrhari has something to say. He clearly demarcated intuition from
perception and inference.14 Intuition occurs to us like a flash. It is altogether
a different type of experience. Intuition occurs in all sentient beings in a
spontaneous manner. Such a form of knowledge, according to Bhartrhari,
is far more reliable than any other form of knowledge for it is direct and
immediate. But BKM argues that although it is not clear from Bhartrhari’s
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interpretation of intuitive knowledge whether it can be treated as non-
empirical or empirical, it is a clear case of non-empirical form of knowledge.
Further BKM alleges that Naiyayikas, the most prominent pramana
theorists, find it difficult to accommodate it in their classification of empirical
forms of knowledge. The scriptural knowledge as viewed by Bhartrhari,
is the highest form of intuitive knowledge.
Contrary to the view advocated by Bhartrhari, Naiyayikas argued
that scriptural knowledge must have some empirical base. They ridiculed
the view that the scriptural texts have no author. Just as the veracity of any
statement is dependent on the trustworthiness of its author or speaker, the
veracity of the scriptural statements must also be dependent on the
infallibility of their author. Therefore, according to Naiyayikas, the author
of the scriptural statements must be person with perfect knowledge, and
he is none other than God. BKM maintains that the notion of ‘trustworthy
person’ can be saved from its sectarian colour and theistic overtone once
we accept the Buddha and the Jaina as trustworthy (apta) persons.  The
truth of dharma is known through their intuitive insight that is non-empirical
in its character. Our religious and moral prescriptions are based on the
knowledge of scriptures and the knowledge of dharma.
Coming to the empirical foundations of our knowledge, pramana
theorists hold that all our cognitive knowledge has empirical base. In this
context, BKM cautions us that - unlike in the Western tradition - there is
no dichotomy made between facts and values I order to understand the
basis of our secular, religious, and moral beliefs.  In a nutshell, the following
are the features of pramana-prameya doctrine advocated by the Indian
epistemologists.15
1. There are valid means or sources of knowledge on the basis
of which we make assertions about what exists, and what is true.
2. There are entities called knowables (prameya), and each
knowable is cognizable. They constitute the world or reality. Each knowable
entity can be grasped or apprehended by our knowledge-episodes.
3. There is no distinction between means of knowing and its
justification. The means themselves justify what is known.
4. Pramana theorists are in agreement with the view that like
the sensation of pain, knowledge episode is an event.
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5.    All knowledge-episodes are cognitive episodes, but not all
cognitive episodes are knowledge episodes, for some cognitive episodes
may not yield truth.
Every pramana, maintains BKM, is both evidential and causal in
its nature. It is evidential for it provides ample justification for the cognitive
episode. It is causal for it is responsible for any cognitive episode. Therefore
it is treated as an ‘instrument’ (karana) and most effective causal factor
(sadhakatama) of the knowledge-episode in question. A pramana is
that which measures. What is to be measured is called prameya. In this
sense, pramana leads us to such cognitive episodes by means of which
we can understand the nature of reality unerringly.
However, reminds BKM, the skeptical challenge to pramana
theorists does not end there. Both an empiricist and a pramana theorist
have to spell out clearly the status and the nature of entities that they
experience, and believe to be there. The pre-philosophical or pre-analytical
belief in the existence of external world independent of perceiver’s
consciousness has to be justified. The skeptic argues that how can a
pramana theorist rationally justify his claim that there is an external world
independent of perceiver’s mind. What are those indubitable data that
serve as the foundation of his knowledge-claim? If the data obtained from
his most immediate experience serves as indubitable foundation of his
knowledge–claim, then the very nature of that data is under investigation.
It is held by the skeptic that the data obtained from one’s immediate
experience are always subjective, for they are not accessible to others.
How can anyone use these subjective data to construct a system of objective
knowledge? As rightly pointed by BKM, there are two alternatives left for
a pramana theorist to explain away his position. According to the first
alternative, he must admit that the objects are exactly the same as those
that we experience in our pre-philosophical and pre-reflective mood. Thus
the world is constituted by middle-sized, measurable, material objects.
The second alternative is that he must construct objects out of the data
obtained from his immediate experience to give a philosophical justification
to his knowledge-claim. These two alternatives led to an age-old
controversy between realists and phenomenalists and immaterialists.  For
instance, BKM characterizes the Nyaya realism and the Buddhist
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phenomenalism in the following manner.16  The following are the features
of Nyaya realism.
1. What we directly perceive in our sense-experience is the
external reality that exists independent of the perceiving subject.
2. All the physical objects, wholes, bodies, and their properties
can be seen and touched. We see and touch wholes and substrata because
they possess parts and properties, but not because we are able to see and
touch these wholes and parts. But in the case of smell, taste, and hear, we
do not smell the flower but the fragrance of the flower, we do not taste
sugar, but its sweetness, we do not hear the train, but only its whistle.
3. The whole is a distinct entity created by arranging the parts,
yet it is not the sum total of its parts. It is over and above the parts.
Similarly, a substratum is distinct from its properties it instantiates. In other
words, properties subsist in substratum.
4. Either perceiving or seeing is regarded as knowing in the direct
sense. There is no secure or basic foundation other than perceiving or
seeing which is indubitable or certain.
5. Although knowledge is not always verbalized, it is verbalizable.
6. Perceptual illusions can be analyzed without bringing in the
notion of sense-datum or sense-impression as an intermediary between
the perceiver and the external world.
7. Knowledge in its ordinary sense is neither self-revealing nor
self-validating. In other words, it is not necessary that every cognitive
event must be noticed or perceived. There is always a possibility that
some cognitive events may occur and pass away unnoticed and
unperceived. In order to communicate the occurrence of a cognitive event
in any form of language it must be inwardly perceived by the subject in
question. This inward experience is called (anuvyavasaya).  One’s
experience of pain and pleasure come under this category.
In contrast to Nyaya realism, the Buddhist phenomenalism can be
characterized in the following manner:
1. What we directly aware of in our perception is only a sensible
quality, and it is doubtful whether such a quality exists independent of its
K. Srinivas  137
instantiation. Also, it is doubted whether an instantiation exist independent
of our sensation of it.
2. What we call material objects, physical objects, and wholes
are only perceived only in  a secondary or metaphorical sense for we do
not have direct access to anything other than their sensible qualities which
are directly given in perception.  In other words, we infer the existence of
material objects, physical objects, and wholes from their sensible qualities.
3. The so-called material or physical objects are nothing but
constructions out of sensory phenomena. A whole is not independent of
its parts taken together. The wholes have only nominal existence
(samvrtisat). They are objects of either unconscious inference or desire-
dominated construction. As regards unconscious inference, which is a form
of vikalpa, it has mere psychological certainty, but not the required logical
certainty. Therefore, such inferential awareness cannot be equated with
knowledge proper.
4. In its most immediate sense, sensing is identified with knowing.
Hence, sensing is the foundation of knowledge. It is indubitable and
incorrigible.
5. Such knowledge is not verbalizable, for it is completely free
from conception. There is no scope for verbalization without concepts.
6. The entity perceived in perceptual illusion is not distinct from
the cognition itself. What is given in sense-illusion is an integral part of the
sensation itself.
7. Knowledge is always self-revealing. Every cognitive event
would be noticed. In other words, no cognitive event can pass away
unnoticed. Like pleasure and pain every cognitive event is self-cognized.
The above cited world-views share the view that the basic
elements of our experience are observable or perceptible individuals. But
the nature of these individuals is treated differently in both world-views.
According to the realist view of Nyaya-Vaisesika, the observable
individuals are physical and the observable phenomena are always explained
in terms of the physical. Contrary to this view, the Buddhist phenomenalists
hold that there is nothing beyond phenomenal, therefore, everything is
reduced to observable phenomena. In spite of these differences, there is
another common point shared by both. They view that an ontological
system must be properly grounded in epistemology in the sense that what
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is epistemologically prior must be the staring point of their respective
ontologies. For a realist what is epistemologically prior is physical entities
with properties. On the contrary, a phenomenalist considers what is directly
apprehended in one’s sense-experience, namely, the phenomenal qualities,
become their epistemological priorities.
To conclude: the contemporary Indian approaches to epistemology
in many respects resemble the approaches of the Western epistemologists.
In fact, it is one’s own ontological priority that paves the way for a suitable
or convenient epistemological doctrine. It is through the latter that the
former gets substantiated or vindicated. The perennial philosophical
problems, whether epistemological or metaphysical/ontological, are
common to both the Indian and the Western philosophical systems. The
controversy between the realists and phenomenalists as regards the nature
of observables in the West is akin to the controversy between the Nyaya
realists and the Buddhist phenonamlists in the classical Indian tradition.
BKM consistently highlighted the point that the controversies and issues
that dominated the modern Western epistemology are very much found in
classical Indian epistemology too. The Western epistemologists cannot
ignore the contributions made by the classical Indian philosophers to the
traditional  theory of knowledge. In the Indian context, epistemology cannot
be segregated from metaphysics/ontology. It is through epistemology that
every school of thought justifies its metaphysical presuppositions. In other
words, our epistemological concerns are basically rooted in our commitment
to a certain type of metaphysics/ontology. Since metaphysical/ontological
commitments vary from school to school, there are bound to be differences
in their epistemological priorities too. This naturally results in the proliferation
of ‘isms’. One cannot deny this fact.
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